Early access · open-source broker

Your agent never holds the keys to prod.

Deadbolt holds them. Your agents keep reads and safe writes. Anything you can't undo, like dropping a database, deleting a volume or changing IAM, waits until an independent reviewer (and for the scary ones, a human) signs that exact action.

Runs in your VPC · AWS + Postgres · Bring your own model keys

deadbolt · prod-approvals

aws rds delete-db-instance
--db-instance-identifier prod-main
--delete-automated-backups

criticaldeletes prod database + all backups
  1. dev-agent (vendor A)requested
  2. reviewer (vendor B)refused
  3. on-call human · passkeynot asked
Held. The agent's token can't do this.

The nine-second problem

Same agent. Same command. Only one of them still has a database.

In a reported April 2026 incident, a coding agent fixing a staging issue found a broad API token and deleted a startup's production database and its backups in one call. There was no confirmation step and no second key. Here's a simulated version on AWS, with and without Deadbolt.

# press play

The replay is a simulation. With Deadbolt on, the receipt is signed with real Ed25519 keys generated in your browser. The replay makes no network calls.

Why guardrails fail

Advice can be ignored. A missing key can't.

Prompt rules

"Never run destructive commands." The agent in that incident had a rule like this, broke it, and then admitted it.

Permission prompts

After enough "Allow?" prompts, people click without reading. And the agent still holds the credential if anything goes around the prompt.

Admin token in .env

Whoever holds it can do anything. Often, that's every agent you run.

How it works

Swap the key. Keep the speed.

01

Swap the key

Agents get a scoped Deadbolt token. The privileged AWS role and the Postgres admin user live in the broker, in your VPC.

02

Classify the action

Opinionated defaults on day one: reads pass, deletes and IAM changes are critical. Edit it all in one YAML file.

03

Second key

Review tier: an agent from a different model vendor signs the exact action digest. Human tier: on-call approves in Slack with a passkey. Critical: both.

04

Execute, with a receipt

The broker runs the action with its own role and writes a signed receipt: who asked, who checked, what exactly ran.

Tiers

passDescribe, Get, SELECTdirect, no broker
reviewScoped updates, instance changescross-vendor agent signs
humanIAM, ALTERpasskey in Slack
criticalDelete DB / volume / bucket, DROP, TRUNCATEboth
# deadbolt.yaml
protect:
  aws:      { role: arn:aws:iam::…:role/deadbolt-privileged }
  postgres: { dsn_env: PROD_DB_ADMIN }
tiers:
  pass:     ["aws:Describe*", "sql:SELECT"]
  review:   ["sql:UPDATE rows<1000"]
  human:    ["aws:iam:*", "sql:ALTER"]
  critical: ["aws:rds:DeleteDBInstance", "aws:ec2:DeleteVolume",
             "aws:s3:DeleteBucket", "sql:DROP", "sql:TRUNCATE"]
reviewer:
  must_differ_from: author_vendor
  key: env:REVIEWER_API_KEY   # bring your own
approvers:
  slack: "#prod-approvals"
  passkey: required

Your keys stay home

We never see your credentials.

The broker will be open source and runs in your VPC. Our cloud sees approval requests, signatures and receipts. It never sees credentials or data.

  • Read every line. The broker will be open source, so you can audit what holds your keys.
  • Fail safe, not fail stuck. Agents keep direct reads and safe writes. If the broker is down, deletes wait and work continues.
  • A stranger checks the work. The reviewer must come from a different model vendor than the agent that asked.
  • Receipts that hold up. Every approval is signed, and anyone with the receipt can verify it.

Compared

Built for a 20-person team shipping with agents.

DeadboltPrompt rulesHarness promptsEnterprise access platforms
Agent holds the prod credentialNeverYesYesNo
Independent, cross-vendor reviewerRequired——Varies
Signed, portable receiptEvery action——Audit log

Put a deadbolt on prod before your agent finds the token.

Early access is free while we build it. Leave your email and we'll be in touch.